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Employment, Wages, and the Economic Cycle:  
Differences between Immigrants and Natives 
 
In this paper, we analyse differences in the cyclical pattern of employment and wages of 
immigrants and natives for two large immigrant receiving countries, Germany and the UK. 
We show that, despite large differences in their immigrant populations, there are similar and 
significant differences in cyclical responses between immigrants and natives in both 
countries, even conditional on education, age, and location. We decompose changes in 
outcomes into a secular trend and a business cycle component. We find significantly larger 
unemployment responses to economic shocks for low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled 
workers and for immigrants relative to natives within the same skill group. There is little 
evidence for differential wage responses to economic shocks. We offer three explanations for 
these findings: an equilibrium search model, where immigrants experience higher job 
separation rates, a model of dual labour markets, and differences in the complementarity of 
immigrants and natives to capital. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  E32, F22, J31 
  






Department of Economics and Business 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
Jaume I Building 
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27 
08005 Barcelona 
Spain 
E-mail: albrecht.glitz@upf.edu   
 2 
1  Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate the way different immigrant groups respond to the economic 
cycle  compared  to  native  workers.  Our  analysis  distinguishes  between  immigrants  from 
OECD-  and  non-OECD  countries,  and  covers  two  of  the  largest  economies  in  Europe: 
Germany and the UK. Both countries have large immigrant populations, which differ in terms 
of origin composition and educational background. We show that there are large differences 
in cyclical responses of unemployment between immigrants and natives in both countries. We 
demonstrate  that  substantial  differences  in  cyclical  patterns  remain,  even  within  narrowly 
defined  skill  groups.  We  also  show  that  developments  in  the  relative  wage  position  of 
immigrants have been quite different in the UK and Germany, in particular over the last 
decade.  
We then estimate a factor-type model that separates responses to economic shocks from a 
secular trend and allows us to obtain a summary measure for differences across and within 
education groups. This analysis confirms the larger cyclical response of unemployment for 
immigrants, in particular for those from non-OECD countries, in both Germany and the UK. 
Our results are robust to alternative measures of economic shocks, and are not driven by 
selective in- and out-migration of individuals over the economic cycle.  
We provide a number of possible explanations for our findings. First, we consider an 
equilibrium  search  model  of  the  type  set  up  by  Diamond  (1982),  Mortensen  (1982),  and 
Pissarides (1985). In this model, differences in the hiring intensity between groups in up- and 
downturns occur if job separation rates differ. We provide evidence for differences in job 
separation rates between immigrants and natives, even within education groups. Second, we 
consider  a  dual  labour  market.  As  a  third  explanation,  we  investigate  the  possibility  of 
differences in capital-labour complementarities between groups. We conclude that each of 
these explanations may contribute to the pattern we observe in our data. 
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  provide  some  background 
information  about  immigration  to  Germany  and  the  UK,  and  economic  outcomes  and 
composition of immigrants in the two countries. We then discuss the data we use for our 
analysis. Section 3 illustrates economic outcomes of different groups of immigrants in both 
Germany  and  the  UK  over  the  economic  cycle,  compares  these  to  outcomes  of  native 
workers, and investigates how much of these differences are due to differences in education, 
age, and regional allocation. Section 4 estimates a model that summarises these differences in 3 
a set of parameters that allows comparisons between groups and across countries. Section 5 
hypothesises about possible explanations for our empirical findings.  
The differential response of immigrants even within the same skill groups, so far largely 
overlooked in the economic literature (a notable exception is recent work by Barth et al., 
2004, 2006), has important implications for immigration policy as well as for the analysis of 
the economic impact of immigration and the adaptation process of immigrant groups in their 
host countries. We discuss these in Section 5. 
 
2  Background and Data 
2.1  Migration to Germany and the UK 
Both the UK and Germany experienced large waves of immigration in the period after 
World War II. The first large wave into Germany was an inflow of ethnic Germans, expelled 
from former German territory, and totalling 12 million between 1945 and 1949 (see Oezcan, 
2004, for details). After 1955, the West German economy grew rapidly and immigration from 
Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia in the late 1950s and early 1960s led to 
a rise in the number of foreign workers to 2.6 million in 1973, or 12 percent of the total labour 
force. The period after 1973 was characterised by family re-unification, and the early 1980s 
saw the arrival of the first larger waves of asylum seekers. Towards the end of the 1980s, and 
accelerated by the fall of the Berlin wall, Germany experienced a new large immigrant inflow 
from the East. The two largest groups were ethnic German immigrants (so-called Aussiedler), 
who migrated from Eastern Europe and beyond, totalling 2.8 million between 1987 and 2001, 
and migrants from Former Yugoslavia who came as refugees as a result of the Yugoslav wars 
of the 1990s. In 2002, there were 7.3 million foreign citizens living in Germany, representing 
8.9 percent of the total population (German Statistical Office). 
Immigration legislation in the UK after World War II, embodied in the 1905 Aliens Act 
and the 1948 British Nationality Act, distinguished formally between Commonwealth and 
non-Commonwealth citizens. Immigration of Commonwealth citizens was most pronounced 
in the two decades after the war. While the early 1950s were characterised by migration from 
the Caribbean, in the late 1950s a growing number of immigrants arrived from India, and later 
from  Pakistan  and  Bangladesh.  After  the  1971  Immigration  Act  brought  an  end  to  the 
privileged position of Commonwealth citizens, an increasing share of immigration was due to 4 
family unification, which remained for a time largely unrestricted. Recently, immigration has 
increased again significantly, mainly as a result of the strong British economy and, after May 
2004, the accession of the new EU member states. In 2002, there were 4.9 million foreign 
born individuals living in the UK, representing 8.3 percent of the total population (British 
Labour Force Survey, own calculations). 
 
2.2  Data and Samples 
Our  analysis  is  based  on  two  large  longitudinal  data  sets.  For  Germany,  we  use  an 
administrative data set provided by the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg (the 
IABS), which is a 2 percent sample of all dependent employees that are subject to social 
security contributions. We focus on West Germany, excluding Berlin, due to the differences 
in wage structure and immigration experience in East Germany and the time span analysed in 
this study. For the UK, we use the British Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a survey of 
private  households  living  in  Great  Britain,  conducted  biannually  from  1973  to  1983,  and 
annually between 1984 and 1991. Since the spring quarter 1992, the survey is conducted 
quarterly as a rotating panel, with individuals included in five consecutive waves. Questions 
on earnings were not asked before the winter quarter of 1992/1993. Both data sets cover 
approximately the same time period, 1982-2001 for Germany and 1981-2005 for the UK, and 
are sufficiently large to analyse minority populations. We provide more details on the data in 
Appendix 1. 
For the UK, immigrant status is defined by country of birth. In contrast, official data in 
Germany  distinguish  between  foreign  and  German  citizenship  (following  the  principle  of 
nationality by descent). In the IABS, therefore, we only observe an individual’s citizenship 
but neither the place of birth nor the year of entry into the country. As an individual born in 
Germany to foreign parents does not automatically obtain German citizenship, there are some 
individuals included in our sample who were born in Germany but have foreign citizenship.
1 
On the other hand, individuals who were born abroad but received German citizenship are 
recorded as Germans in our data. For simplicity, we will in what follows refer to the foreign 
                                                 
1 Between 1993 and 2002, the share of these second generation immigrants in the 25-54 age bracket 
considered in our analysis is small, between 3.5 percent and 7.5 percent (numbers based on tabulations provided 
by the Statistical Office in Germany). 5 
sample in the German data as “immigrants” and the German sample as “natives”. We will use 
the same terminology for the foreign born and native born in the UK. 
To account for group differences in a parsimonious way that allows comparability across 
the two countries, we distinguish between immigrants from OECD and non-OECD countries.
2 
We expect immigrants from OECD countries to be endowed with human capital that is more 
suited to the requirements of the host countries’ labour markets. As outcome measures, we 
focus on unemployment and wages. In Appendix 1 we describe our measures in more detail 
and discuss comparability. 
2.2.1  Composition of Immigrant Populations 
Reflecting the different migration histories of Germany and the UK, the composition of 
the immigrant populations over the last two decades differs considerably between the two 
countries. While the overall immigrant share in the age group 25-54 decreased in Germany 
from 10.8 percent in 1981 to 8.6 percent in 2001, it increased from 8.4 percent to 10.4 percent 
in the UK over the same period. In Germany, about 27 percent of the immigrant population in 
1981 originates from a non-OECD country; by 2001, this share has increased to about 33 
percent. In the UK, about 58 percent of all immigrants originate from a non-OECD country in 
1981, and this fraction increases to about 64 percent in 2001. Breaking down the data by 
origin shows that while for Germany the largest OECD group in 2001 is Turkish (42 percent 
of  all  OECD  immigrants),  it  is  Irish  for  the  UK  (20  percent  of  all  OECD  immigrants). 
Immigrants from India and Pakistan make up most of the non-OECD group in the UK in 2001 
(together  24  percent  of  all  non-OECD  immigrants),  while  it  is  immigrants  from  Former 
Yugoslavia in Germany (44 percent of all non-OECD immigrants). 
2.2.2  Individual Characteristics 
In Table 1, we report some characteristics for natives and immigrants for the year 2001. 
For Germany, we distinguish between three educational levels: Individuals who have no post-
secondary  education  (low  education);  individuals  who  have  post-secondary  vocational 
                                                 
2 Current OECD member countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
Australia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, United States, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Poland, and Turkey. 
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training  (intermediate  education);  and  individuals  who  have  university  education  (high 
education). Similar to the classification for Germany, for the UK, the low education group 
refers to individuals without any post-secondary education. As intermediate education we 
code GCE A Level or equivalent, GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent and other qualifications. 
The high education group comprises individuals holding a university degree or other higher 
education qualifications. 
The figures in Table 1 show that the percentage of college graduates among natives in 
Germany is far lower than in the UK. This is due to the fact that a large part of professional 
training  that  is  offered  by  colleges  in  the  UK  is  offered  by  the  apprenticeship  system  in 
Germany. While in Germany the share of college-educated individuals is substantially lower 
in the immigrant than in the native population, in the UK the share of those with a college 
education is higher for both OECD and non-OECD immigrants. Overall, and in comparison to 
natives, immigrants in the UK are considerably better educated than they are in Germany.  
Mean log real wages for both men and women are significantly lower among immigrants 
in Germany, with a particular disadvantage for those who come from non-OECD countries. In 
the UK, wages are higher for each immigrant group, except non-OECD men. The wage rates 
of immigrants from OECD countries are particularly remarkable. Men and women earn on 
average 19 and 22 percent higher wages than their native counterparts, respectively. Finally, 
in  both  Germany  and  the  UK,  unemployment  rates  of  immigrants,  with  the  exception  of 
OECD men in the UK, are considerably higher than those of natives.  
In the bottom row of Table 1 we present the normalised Herfindahl index to measure 
regional  concentration  of  natives  and  immigrants.
3  This  index  is  bound  between  zero 
(individuals are equally distributed across regions) and one (complete concentration in one 
region). For Germany, the index is 0.08 for natives and 0.11 for immigrants, suggesting that 
immigrants are not particularly concentrated relative to the native population. This is in stark 
contrast to the UK. Here the index is 0.02 for natives and 0.15 for immigrants, suggesting a 
much  stronger  regional  concentration,  particularly  so  for  immigrants  from  non-OECD 
                                                 
3 The index is defined as  ( ) ) / 1 ( 1 / / 1
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either natives, OECD or non-OECD immigrants, living in region i, and N is the overall number of regions.  7 
countries. This is largely due to about 40 percent of non-OECD immigrants living in London, 
compared to only 8 percent of the native born.  
To summarise, it appears that the composition of the immigrant populations in Germany 
and the UK differs considerably with respect to origin. Furthermore, immigrants are, relative 
to natives, far better educated in the UK, and earn higher wages. In both countries, immigrants 
tend to experience higher unemployment rates than natives. 
 
3  Economic Outcomes and the Economic Cycle 
3.1  Macroeconomic Conditions 
Over the last three decades, macroeconomic conditions have changed in both countries in 
roughly similar ways (see Figure 1). For instance, according to GDP growth (based on data 
provided by the Statistical Office for Germany and the OECD for the UK), recessions in 
Germany  and  the  UK  occur  largely  simultaneously.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  the 
recessions of the mid 1970s (dated by the CEPR Business Cycle Dating Committee to last 
from 1974q3 to 1975q1) and early 1980s (1980q1-1982q3). In the latest major recession of 
the early 1990s, the German economy (1992q1-1993q3) was hit about 1 year later than the 
UK, due to German re-unification. As also shown in Figure 1, both Germany and the UK 
experienced considerable increases in unemployment in the early-mid 1980s recession, with 
some improvement towards the end of the decade. The early 1990s recession led again to an 
increase in unemployment in both countries. However, while unemployment figures started 
coming down shortly after this recession in the UK, this was not the case for Germany where 
unemployment  continued  to  rise  throughout  the  decade,  with  a  small  temporary  decrease 
towards the end of the 1990s/early 2000s. Since the recession of the early 1990s, the British 
economy has grown at a steady pace of approximately 3.1 percent per year in real terms, and 
the unemployment rate has continuously declined to a level of less than 5 percent in 2005. In 
West Germany, unemployment has increased substantially over the period, reaching about 8 
percent in 2005. Furthermore economic growth was sluggish with an average annual growth 
rate of only about 0.7 percent between 1995 and 2005.  
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3.2  Unemployment and Wages over the Economic Cycle 
3.2.1  Unemployment 
We now turn to unemployment rate differentials between natives and immigrants from 
OECD and non-OECD countries for Germany and the UK. As some of these differences may 
be  explained  by  differences  in  observable  characteristics,  we  condition  on  educational 
attainment, age structure, and regional allocation. We estimate the following model, choosing 
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where 
g
it y  is the outcome for individual i belonging to group g (natives, OECD immigrants, 
non-OECD immigrants) in period  t, 
g
it X  is a vector of additional controls such as gender, 
education, age, etc., and 
g
it e  is an error term. The variables  t d  are year dummies for each year 
t, and the 
g
t T  represent the interactions of the group indicator g with the year dummies. The 
estimated parameters 
g
t γ  are the group mean labour market outcomes of OECD/non-OECD 
immigrants  relative  to  the  native  population  (picked  up  by  t γ )  conditional  on  variables 
included in 
g
it X . By sequentially adding age, age squared and interactions of our education 
groups and year dummies (dashed line), and interactions of region and year dummies (dotted 
line), we eliminate differences in estimates of economic outcomes between groups that may 
be due to differences in these observable characteristics. We plot the resulting estimates of 
g
t γ  
in Figure 2.  
We first focus on the solid lines that depict differentials that condition on gender only. At 
the start of the 1980s, unemployment rates in Germany were very similar for natives and the 
two groups of immigrants. The 1980s recession led to a larger increase in unemployment for 
immigrants, but in the subsequent recovery phase unemployment also dropped faster for the 
two immigrant groups, closing the unemployment gap. In the 1990s recession, unemployment 
again grew considerably faster for immigrants than it did for natives, leading to a dramatic 
increase in the unemployment rate differential between both groups of immigrants and natives 
at the height of the recession. Towards the end of the 1990s, unemployment of immigrants 
seemed again to drop more rapidly than unemployment of natives but, compared to the early 9 
1980s, there remained a sizeable difference between the two immigrant groups and natives. 
The figures thus suggest a strong cyclical development in unemployment differences between 
immigrants and natives. 
For the UK, the solid line in the lower panel of Figure 2 shows a positive unemployment 
rate differential between immigrants from non-OECD countries and natives as early as 1981. 
Unemployment for OECD immigrants on the other hand was similar to that of natives. As in 
Germany,  the  1980s  recession  had  a  larger  impact  on  non-OECD  immigrants:  the 
unemployment  rate  differential  increases  substantially,  but  decreases  again  rapidly  in  the 
subsequent  recovery  phase.  The  early  1990s  recession  saw  unemployment  of  immigrants 
rising once more considerably faster than unemployment of natives, and in particular so for 
non-OECD immigrants. After the end of the recession, the unemployment rate differentials 
decreased yet again. Overall, the figures for the UK suggest a similar pattern in the difference 
in unemployment rates as in Germany, with a somewhat more pronounced cyclicality for non-
OECD immigrants than for OECD immigrants. 
The dashed line in the upper panel of Figure 2 suggests that conditioning on age and 
education reduces the unemployment differential between Germans and immigrants in both 
groups;  however,  the  differences  in  the  cyclical  pattern  remain.  Conditioning  further  on 
regional allocation does not lead to significant changes in the conditional unemployment rate 
differentials. The differences between the conditional and unconditional patterns in the UK, 
shown in the lower panel of Figure 2, are smaller than in Germany. This is not surprising, as 
the  age  and  education  structure  of  immigrants  in  the  UK  resembles  that  of  the  native 
population more closely, as shown in Table 1. However, as for Germany, we still see a clear 
cyclical pattern in unemployment rate differentials in the early 1980s and 1990s, particularly 
pronounced for non-OECD immigrants. 
3.2.2  Wages 
Figure 3 displays log wage differentials for Germany and the UK, where the solid line 
conditions on gender only. For Germany there is a wage differential of about 8-9 percent in 
favour  of  native  workers  relative  to  both  groups  of  immigrants  in  1980.  During  the  first 
recession, this wage differential remained fairly constant, but it increased dramatically from 
the  early  1990s  onwards,  in  particular  for  non-OECD  immigrants.  As  in  the  case  of 
unemployment, there is a reduction in the differential between the two immigrant groups and 
natives when we condition on age, education and regional allocation, suggesting that part of 10 
the differential is due to composition. However, after 1990,  controlling for differences in 
observable characteristics can only account for around one third of the widening wage gap 
between  natives  and  non-OECD  immigrants,  still  leaving  a  gap  of  more  than  15  percent 
unexplained  by  2000.  The  conditional  wage  gap  between  natives  and  OECD  immigrants, 
while being close to zero throughout the 1980s, stabilises at about 5 percent throughout the 
1990s. In the lower panel of Figure 3, we display the conditional log wage differentials for the 
UK. Here we only have wage information after 1991. The difference to Germany is quite 
striking. Conditioning on age and education does not affect the differential between natives 
and  OECD  immigrants;  it  does,  however,  turn  the  differential  between  non-OECD 
immigrants and natives  negative. This is the opposite of what we find  for Germany, and 
suggests that non-OECD immigrants would worsen their relative wage position in comparison 
to natives if they had the same age and education structure. The slight overall wage advantage 
of  non-OECD  immigrants  turns  into  a  substantial  disadvantage  when  keeping  individual 
characteristics the same. Moreover, the wage differential relative to natives worsens further 
when we condition on region dummies, which is due to an over-representation of immigrants 
in high-wage London. As opposed to Germany, there is no deterioration in relative wages for 
immigrants in the UK between 1992 and 2005. 
To  sum  up,  our  findings  suggest  that  for  both  Germany  and  the  UK,  unemployment 
probabilities of immigrants are more sensitive to the economic cycle than those of natives. 
Conditioning  on  individual  characteristics  and  regional  allocation  reduces  this  differential 
slightly in the case of Germany, but the stronger pro-cyclical pattern for immigrants remains. 
For wages, there is not much evidence for cyclical differentials either in Germany or the UK. 
While in the UK relative wages of immigrants did not change much over the observation 
period, there seems to be a long-term gradual deterioration of the relative wage position of 
immigrants in Germany, in particular since the early 1990s. 
 
4  Differential  Responses  to  Economic  Shocks  across 
Groups 
4.1  The Model 
We now estimate a more structural model to summarise the evidence we have provided 
so far and to quantify the differential response of different skill groups, and of natives and 11 
immigrants within the same skill group. The idea of our approach is similar to Hoynes (2000). 
We utilise differences in economic shocks across regions and over time to identify the relative 
response of different education and population groups to such shocks, conditional on region 
effects, age effects, and a group-specific time trend. Our outcome variables are unemployment 
rates and log wages. The model allows us to assess the magnitude by which outcomes of the 
groups  react  differently  to  economic  shocks,  and  to  test  whether  these  differences  are 
statistically significant. 






















jrt y  is the labour market outcome (unemployment rates or average log wages) of skill 
group  j  (defined  by  education  and  gender)  in  region  r  in  time  period  t.  The  index  g 
distinguishes between natives, OECD- and non-OECD immigrants. The skill-specific labour 
market outcome is a function of a fixed group and skill effect 
g
j a , a group and skill-specific 
time trend 
g
j b , six age group shares 
g
ajrt S , a fixed region effect  r µ , and a measure of the 
region-specific business cycle effect  rt f . The common factor  rt f  is assumed to be identical 
for all skill and immigrant groups. The coefficient 
g
j c  measures the responsiveness of group g 
with skill level j to business cycle fluctuations, as captured by the common factor  rt f . This 
econometric model is flexible in that we allow for as many independent common factors as 
there are regions and only assume that the group- and skill-specific coefficients are identical 
across regions (and of course time). Moreover, we do not impose any restrictions on these 
factors.  For  example,  if  there  are  11  regions  and  12  time  periods,  then  there  are  132 
unobserved common factors.  


















Possible  measures  for  business  cycle  shocks  could  be  the  overall  region-specific 
unemployment rate or the regional GDP (growth). However, these measures are likely to pick 
up only part of the shock that hits a particular region. Furthermore, it is not clear whether an 12 
appropriate measure for a shock that impacts on employment and wages are current or past 
changes, or combinations thereof. We therefore estimate shocks  rt f ∆  as the parameter on the 
interaction  term  of  year  t  and  region  r,  rt T .  Denote  these  parameters  as rt β .  Our  final 

















δ β .                (1) 
In this model, identification of parameters 
g
j b  and 
g
j c  is obtained by assuming that the 
labour market-specific shocks  rt β  are identical for all groups g and skill levels j . Both sets of 
parameters need to be normalised. We set 
g
j c  equal to one and 
g
j b  equal to zero for the base 
group, which we choose to be native male workers with university education for Germany and 
native male workers with a university degree or other higher education qualification for the 
UK. The reported estimates of 
g
j c  measure the deviations of the outcome 
g
jrt y  from its long-
term trend, relative to the reference group. 
If the differential response to the economic cycle, as illustrated in Section 3.2, was only 
due to different skill compositions of the native and the immigrant population, then for a 
given skill group j, the parameter 
g
j c  should be the same for immigrants and natives. 
  
4.2  Estimation Results 
Table 2 reports results of Eq. (1) for Germany and the UK. Our focus in this section is on 
men. For completeness we report results for women in Appendix 2, Table A1. For the UK, we 
pool 2 subsequent years in order to obtain a sufficient number of observations within skill- 
and origin group for each of the 11 UK regions. We report the estimated parameters 
g
j c  for 
the unemployment rates for each of our 9  groups (3 education x 3 nationality/origin) for 
Germany and the UK in columns (1) and (2), and the corresponding parameters for wages in 
columns (3) and (4). We report the standard errors underneath the coefficient estimates where 
                                                 
4 This model can be seen as a special case of a strict factor model, setting the first common factor equal 
to unity. Such a strict factor model in turn is a special case of a dynamic factor model as set out, for instance, in 
Forni  et  al.  (2000),  in  which  there  is  an  additional  set  of  lagged  common  factors  (see  also  Breitung  and 
Eickmeier, 2006; Lütkepohl, 2006, Ch. 18.2). 13 
asterisks  (*)  are  used  to  indicate  that  a  coefficient  is  statistically  different  from  one  (the 
parameter of the base group) at the 5 percent level. We also test the hypothesis that responses 
of the two immigrant groups are different from those of native workers within the same skill 
group. Significant differences in estimates at the 5 percent level are in this case marked with a 
cross (+).  
For both Germany and the UK, the estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 
show that the unemployment rates of low-educated individuals fluctuate stronger over the 
business cycle than the unemployment rates of the highly educated. For natives in Germany, 
for instance, the estimate increases from 1 for the reference group with college education to 
2.4 for the group with intermediate education, and to 4.5 for the group with a low education 
level. This indicates that the response of the unemployment  rate of low-educated men to 
macroeconomic shocks is stronger by factor 4.5 than the response of highly educated men. 
The estimates for the UK are remarkably similar in magnitude.  
Within  skill  groups,  immigrants  appear  to  be  far  more  responsive  to  the  cycle  than 
natives. While natives with intermediate education in Germany respond 2.4 times stronger to 
business cycle shocks than natives with college education, OECD immigrants react 4.2 times 
stronger and non-OECD immigrants 5.7 times stronger. Within the group of low-educated 
individuals, the responsiveness of OECD immigrants to shocks is similar to that of natives, 
but  the  responsiveness  of  non-OECD  immigrants  is  substantially  stronger,  with  a  point 
estimate of 6.7.  
For the UK, natives and OECD immigrants with intermediate education react similarly to 
shocks with an estimate of around 2.9, but non-OECD immigrants react significantly stronger 
than both of these groups, with a point estimate of 4.2. Within the group of low-educated 
individuals, point estimates suggest again that both groups of immigrants respond stronger 
than their native counterparts (5.1 and 5.5, respectively, compared to 3.9 for natives) although 
the estimated differences between groups are not statistically significant. 
For women the results in Table A1 in Appendix 2 confirm the overall pattern that we find 
for  men,  though  with  somewhat  smaller  differences  across  skill  groups.  As  for  men, 
immigrants tend to react stronger to economic shocks than natives, with OECD immigrants in 
Germany and non-OECD immigrants in the UK appearing to be particularly sensitive. 
We now turn to wages, and we report results in the last two columns of Table 2. For 
Germany the numbers in column (3) suggest that the wage fluctuations over the business 14 
cycle are somewhat larger for native men with intermediate and low levels of education, 
compared  to  the  highly  educated.  Within  skill  groups,  though,  we  only  find  statistically 
significant  differences  in  the  responsiveness  of  wages  to  economic  shocks  for  medium-
educated  OECD  immigrants  and  low-educated  non-OECD  immigrants.  In  both  cases 
immigrants’  wages  are  less  responsive  than  wages  of  comparable  natives.  This  may  be 
explained  by  the  stronger  responsiveness  of  immigrant  employment,  which  may  result  in 
more selection into and out of unemployment.  
Results for wages of men in the UK are displayed in column (4) of Table 2. There seem 
to be no clear differences across skill groups in the response to economic shocks. As for 
Germany, there is also little evidence of a differential response to economic shocks between 
immigrants and natives within skill categories. Only the estimate for non-OECD immigrants 
with intermediate education is significantly higher than that for natives.  
For women, results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table A1 in Appendix 2. The 
reference group continues to be highly educated men. For both countries, and similar to men, 
there  is  little  evidence  of  large  differences  between  immigrants  and  natives  within  skill 
groups.  
To  summarise,  we  find  sizeable  and  statistically  significant  differences  between 
immigrants  and  natives  in  their  unemployment  response  within  education  groups.  These 
differences are particularly pronounced for immigrants from non-OECD countries. On the 
other hand, there is little evidence of differential responses of immigrants and natives in terms 
of wages. Next, we will investigate whether our findings are explained by cyclical in- and out-
migration, and whether they are robust to alternative measures for the business cycle. We will 
also analyse whether responses are symmetric in economic up- and downturns. 
 
4.3  Extensions 
4.3.1  Cyclical In- and Out-migration 
 One explanation for the strong cyclical behaviour of immigrants’ unemployment rates 
may be selective in- or out-migration. For instance, if entry of immigrants is driven by the 
economic cycle, so that immigrants are drawn to Germany and the UK during expansions, one 
may expect to see the unemployment rate for immigrants fall faster than for natives (since 
new immigrants are likely to come with a job, essentially adding an employed person to the 15 
denominator of the unemployment rate).  Self-selection of immigrants into regions that offer 
the  highest  wages  and  lowest  unemployment  rates  has  been  documented  by  a  number  of 
studies (see, for instance, Borjas 2001, and, more recently, Jaeger 2007). One way to address 
this is to use a balanced panel and examine how individuals who have already been living in 
the country in some base period perform over the business cycle. For Germany, we thus re-
estimate our model, restricting the immigrant sample to those immigrants that we observe in 
the data in 1982.  For the UK, we restrict the sample to those foreign born individuals that 
report having immigrated in or before 1981. 
We report results for unemployment for men in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. Although 
typically smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated, the parameter estimates of 
g
j c  
show the same pattern as those we report in Table 2. The responsiveness to economic shocks 
increases with lower educational attainment. Both OECD and non-OECD immigrants react 
more  strongly  than  their  native  counterparts,  with  the  exception  of  low-educated  OECD 
immigrants in Germany who now show less responsiveness than comparable native workers. 
Thus, the cyclical response we observe seems not to be driven by in-migration reacting to the 
economic cycle.
5  
4.3.2  Business Cycle Measures  
So  far,  we  have  modelled  business  cycle  effects  as  an  unobserved  region-  and  time-
specific factor. As explained earlier, we believe that this captures all the relevant influences 
on unemployment variations across groups. We now check whether the results are similar 
when we use an alternative measure for the economic cycle. One such measure is the region-
specific deviation of GDP growth from its trend. We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to obtain 
a decomposition of GDP into a trend component and a cyclical component. We then replace 
the nonlinear term of the unobserved factor ( rt rt
g
j T c β ) in Eq. (1) with the interactions of the 
education/nationality groups and the cyclical component of the HP-filtered GDP time series 
                                                 
5 Due to its longitudinal nature, the data for Germany also allow us to check whether our findings are 
due to selective out-migration by further restricting the immigrant sample to those individuals that we observe 
both in the base period 1982 and in the final period 2001. The general pattern across and within education groups 
that we report in Table 2 still persists even in this very restricted sample.  16 
for each region.
6 In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 we report the results for Germany and the 
UK. The estimated coefficients are very similar to those we obtain earlier. Using measures for 
business cycle shocks that are conventionally used in macroeconomics, we thus reach similar 
conclusions to those we discussed above.  
4.3.3  Asymmetric Unemployment Response 
So far, we assume the differential response of immigrants and natives to be symmetric in 
economic upturns and downturns. This may be too strong an assumption. In Section 5, we 
discuss a number of different theoretical explanations, which suggest that this differential 
response is not necessarily symmetric. To investigate this issue, we re-estimate our models, 
allowing for different responses during periods of economic expansion and contraction. As 
this requires us to determine when a recession or a boom period begins, this harbours a certain 
degree of arbitrariness. Based on the macroeconomic indicators in Figure 1, we define the 
years of an economic downturn for Germany to be 1982-1983 and 1993-1997, and for the UK 
1981-1986 and 1991-1992.  
Table  4  reports  the  results.  Columns  (1)  and  (3)  show  the  group-specific  effects  in 
economic  upturns,  and  columns  (2)  and  (4)  show  the  difference  in  group-specific  effects 
between economic downturns and economic upturns. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) 
provide  no  evidence  for  differences  in  cyclical  responses  in  boom  and  bust  periods  in 
Germany: none of the parameter estimates in column (2) is significantly different from zero. 
In the UK the pattern is somewhat different: there is some evidence that during an economic 
contraction  the  low-educated  individuals  (and,  to  some  degree,  those  with  intermediate 
education) react less strongly relative to the reference group of native high-skilled men than 
during  an  economic  expansion.  The  responsiveness  of  both  OECD  and  non-OECD 
immigrants with low education and comparable natives during an economic downturn is quite 
similar,  with  parameter  estimates  of  2.407  (calculated  by  the  sum  of  the  corresponding 
parameters in columns (3) and (4)), 4.532 and 2.935, respectively. Accordingly, while the 
results for Germany suggest roughly symmetric responses – immigrants lose jobs faster in 
                                                 
6  Regional  GDP  data  on  German  regions  (“Länder”)  were  obtained  from  the  Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder, and UK regional GDP data from National Statistics UK. All GDP time series are 
adjusted using time series of the corresponding consumer price index. Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we 
choose  25 . 6 = λ  when filtering the GDP time series. 17 
downturns, but gain jobs faster in upturns – the results for the UK point towards asymmetric 
responses. Differential adjustments both across and within skill groups seem to primarily take 
place during periods of economic expansion. During periods of economic contraction, the 
responsiveness across and within groups is more homogenous. 
 
5  Explaining Differences in Cyclical Responses  
From  our  empirical  investigation  the  following  three  findings  stand  out:  First,  the 
cyclicality of unemployment rates is the stronger, the lower the educational qualification of 
workers. Second, within education groups the cyclicality in unemployment is stronger for 
immigrants  than  for  natives,  and  strongest  for  non-OECD  immigrants.  And  third,  the 
difference in cyclicality between natives and immigrants seems to be symmetric in Germany – 
immigrants  lose  jobs  faster  or  remain  longer  unemployed  in  downturns,  but  get  back  to 
employment faster in upturns – but asymmetric in the UK. Here a stronger responsiveness of 
immigrants  appears  to  be  present  predominantly  in  periods  of  economic  expansion.  In 
addition, wages are generally found to be unresponsive to the business cycle. In this section 
we discuss three possible explanations for the differential cyclical responses of unemployment 
rates.  
 
5.1  Equilibrium Search  
Our  first  explanation  builds  on  a  standard  DMP  equilibrium  search  model,  a  line  of 
research  originating  in  the  work  of  Diamond  (1982),  Mortensen  (1982),  and  Pissarides 
(1985).  In  DMP  models  unemployment  is  due  to  search  frictions.  In  the  simplest  set-up, 
which we consider here, established matches break up at a given rate that is constant over the 
business cycle.
7 Hiring of workers by firms depends on whether firms and workers can find 
suitable matches, which in turn depends on the profitability of opening (costly) vacancies. The 
higher the pay-off for opening a vacancy, the more vacancies are created and the higher is the 
number  of  established  matches.  Over  the  business  cycle  expected  pay-offs  of  vacancies 
fluctuate with labour productivity and so does hiring of workers and hence the unemployment 
rate.  For  the  present  purpose,  the  crucial  insight  is  that  the  higher  the  group-specific 
                                                 
7 For an excellent overview of the debate in this literature on this assumption, see Yashiv (2007). 18 
separation rate, the stronger the volatility of expected pay-offs, implying greater fluctuations 
in the number of created vacancies and hence jobs.  
The basic intuition for this result is the following. The longer a worker is expected to stay 
with the firm (i.e., the lower the separation rate), the greater is the impact of his productivity 
in the more distant future for the firm’s value of the match. That is, the lower the separation 
rate, the less important becomes the worker's current productivity and the more important 
becomes the impact of the worker’s average productivity for the firm's investment decision 
(opening of vacancies). By contrast, the higher the separation rate, the more closely firms 
follow the business cycle and the more pro-cyclical is their offer of vacancies. The differential 
response to business cycle shocks of different labour types with identical labour productivity 
in this model is thus driven by different levels of (time-invariant) separation rates. For our 
analysis, if within education groups, immigrants are more likely to leave a job earlier, then 
fewer  vacancies  will  be  made  available  for  them  in  a  recession,  thus  increasing  their 
unemployment  relative  to  natives.  On  the  other  hand,  in  a  boom  phase  relatively  more 
vacancies will be created that are to be filled with immigrant workers. Thus, in this model 
neutral  macroeconomic  shocks,  affecting  the  productivity  of  the  different  types  of  labour 
symmetrically, are transmitted into asymmetrically strong cycles of unemployment rates. In 
Appendix 3 we provide a more formal exposition of this argument.  
Whether immigrants have lower or higher separation rates in jobs is empirically testable. 
With our data, we can compute overall survival probabilities within jobs for Germany, as we 
can follow individuals over time. In Panel A of Table 5, we display Kaplan-Meier survival 
probabilities for men, distinguishing between different education groups and between natives 
and the two groups of immigrants. The figures show that survival probabilities are lower for 
both groups of immigrants at each year of firm tenure. There is also some evidence that the 
survival probabilities fall with decreasing educational attainment of workers. To eliminate 
differences due to the economic cycle and age composition, we estimate Cox proportional 
hazard  models  for  the  two  immigrant  groups  relative  to  native  workers.  The  estimates, 
stratified by age group and year, are displayed in Panel B of Table 5. They show that the 
hazard rates of leaving employment of male immigrants are typically higher than those of 
natives within each education group, and that the difference tends to be larger for non-OECD 
immigrants. Interestingly, in the one case in which the hazard rate does not differ from the 
one of comparable natives (OECD immigrants with low education) we also do not find a 
differential responsiveness to economic shocks in our results in Table 2.  19 
These findings are compatible with the hypothesis that differences in separation rates 
within  education  groups  may  be  partly  responsible  for  the  different  cyclical  response  of 
natives and immigrants through the equilibrium search mechanism explained above. But what 
could  be  a  cause  for  possible  differences  in  separation  rates  between  the  two  immigrant 
groups and natives? One reason is return migration. Immigrants have a higher probability to 
leave the labour market as they may return to their home countries. This would inevitably lead 
to a termination of the employment relationship. There is evidence that return propensities 
may be substantial. For instance, for the UK, Dustmann and Weiss (2007) show that after 
about 5 years in the country, more than 40 percent of all immigrants have returned back 
home. Mayr and Peri (2008) show that in the U.S. the return migration rate of even those that 
stayed at least 1 to 4 years amounts to around 20 percent. A recent OECD publication (OECD 
2008, Table III.1) reports similar out-migration rates for other countries: The average out-
migration rate after 5 years ranges from 28 percent for the Netherlands to 60 percent for 
Ireland. 
5.2  Dual Labour Markets  
Our second explanation builds on a dual labour market model similar to that discussed in 
Bulow and Summers (1986). In their standard framework, there is a homogenous group of 
workers and two types of jobs, primary and secondary jobs, that differ in their monitoring 
technology. In primary jobs monitoring costs are high and firms therefore have to pay workers 
higher wages in order to prevent shirking. In secondary jobs monitoring costs are low. As a 
consequence, secondary jobs can be filled at relatively low costs and hence wages paid in 
these  jobs  follow  closely  marginal  labour  productivity.  Differences  in  monitoring  costs 
therefore lead to a two-tier labour market with workers in the primary sector having more 
secure and better paid jobs than workers in the secondary sector. In particular, due to the 
different adjustment costs in primary and secondary sectors, neutral productivity shocks have 
asymmetric effects on employment in both sectors.
8  
                                                 
8 When reducing their labour force, firms in the primary sector have to pay the remaining workers 
higher wages, as primary workers in firms that announce to lay off workers in the future would shirk if their 
wages  were  kept  at  the  pre-announcement  rates.  Downsizing  in  firms  in  the  primary  sector  hence  leads  to 
increases in wages of those workers who stay. As firms in the primary sector face relatively high costs when 
adjusting  their  labour  force  due  to  productivity  shocks,  swings  in  labour  demand  for  primary  workers  are 20 
In an extension of this model, Bulow and Summers (1986) also show that if there are two 
types  of  workers  differing  only  in  their  propensity  to  leave  their  jobs  (immigrants  and 
natives), then competition among firms ensures that in equilibrium a higher proportion of the 
type of labour with the higher turnover rate (immigrants) is confined to the secondary sector. 
The reason for this is that in equilibrium within each sector both types of labour are paid the 
same wage but, all else equal, in order to induce the same effort of both types of workers, 
wages would have to be higher for workers with relatively high turnover (immigrants). In 
equilibrium, chances of moving to the primary sector must therefore be smaller for secondary-
sector workers with high turnover rates. Thus, although immigrants are equally productive, in 
equilibrium they are more often  employed in the secondary sector, where labour demand 
follows  more  closely  total  factor  productivity  over  the  economic  cycle  because  of  lower 
labour adjustment costs. Given some stickiness of secondary-sector wages, which is assumed 
to be identical for natives and immigrants, employment of immigrants should therefore be 
more volatile than employment of natives.  
5.3  Capital-skill Complementarity 
Our last explanation builds on capital-skill complementarity (Griliches, 1969, Krusell et 
al., 2000, Funk and Vogel, 2004). The main assumption here is that there is a fixed factor, say 
physical  capital,  which  enters  asymmetrically  into  the  production  function  of  the  firm. 
Symmetric  productivity  shocks  (neutral  shocks  to  total  factor  productivity)  then  result  in 
asymmetric shifts of the labour demand  curves  of different types of labour.  If wages are 
somewhat sticky, the asymmetric complementarity of the different labour types with capital 
results in asymmetric effects on unemployment, even when productivity shocks are neutral. 
Suppose that wages of all labour types are equally sticky, and capital is fixed. If the 
degree to which the various labour types can be substituted by capital is not equal for all 
labour types, then adjustments of employment will be stronger for labour types that are better 
substitutes  for  capital.  During  downturns  firms  want  to  reduce  all  factor  inputs  but,  by 
assumption, capital stocks cannot be adjusted. Therefore, firms reduce their demand more for 
those factors that are the closest substitutes for capital. By contrast, during upturns firms want 
to increase all factor inputs. However, since capital inputs are fixed they hire in particular 
                                                                                                                                                         
somewhat dampened compared to the volatility of labour demand in the secondary sector. See Saint-Paul (1996, 
Ch. 3 and 4) for more details. 21 
those workers that are the closest substitutes for capital. The argument extends to immigrants 
and natives within skill groups if immigrants are less complementary to capital than natives. 
This could be the case if immigrants cannot realise the full return to their observable skills 
due to, for instance, a lack of language proficiency, preventing them to work in jobs that are 
more complementary to capital.  
We investigate this possibility using data provided by the Federal Institute for Vocational 
Education  and  Training  (BIBB)  on  task  content  and  computer  use  of  11,688  workers  in 
Germany in 1997. Estimating a set of linear probability models, we find that, conditional on 
educational attainment, immigrants have a 17 percentage point lower probability of working 
with a computer, a 5 percentage point lower probability of performing analytical tasks, and a 
7 percentage point higher probability of performing routine manual tasks than native workers. 
This  is  compatible  with  the  hypothesis  that,  within  skill  groups,  immigrants  are  less 
complementary to capital. 
 
6  Discussion and Conclusions 
Our results suggest larger unemployment responses to economic shocks for immigrants 
relative to natives within skill groups. These differences are particularly pronounced for non-
OECD immigrants, and evident for both Germany and the UK, despite their rather different 
immigrant  populations.  We  find  little  evidence  in  both  countries  that  wage  responses  of 
immigrants to shocks are different than those of natives within skill groups. We show that our 
results are not driven by selective in- and out-migration of immigrants, or by the way we 
identify region-specific shocks. 
We offer three explanations for these findings. First, within an equilibrium search model, 
immigrants’ unemployment may react stronger to the economic cycle if they are experiencing 
higher job separation rates. We show that job survival rates of immigrants are systematically 
lower and separation rates are higher, even within skill groups. Second, within a model of 
dual labour markets, immigrants could be overrepresented in the secondary sector due to their 
higher job separation rates. Again, this would imply higher volatility in their unemployment 
experience over the economic cycle. And finally, if immigrants are less complementary to 
capital  than  natives  and  wages  are  somewhat  sticky,  this  would  also  lead  to  the  cyclical 
response we observe. Compatible with this, we demonstrate that immigrants in Germany are 22 
(conditional  on  education)  less  likely  to  work  in  jobs  that  use  computers,  more  likely  to 
perform tasks that are routine, and less likely to perform tasks that are analytical. 
Our analysis has implications for other areas of research on immigration. In the literature 
on the economic assimilation of immigrants,
9 identification of cohort effects is often achieved 
by assuming that immigrants and natives react to macro shocks in the same way (see e.g.  
Borjas, 1999). In two recent papers, Barth et al. (2004, 2006) point out that differences in the 
response  to  macroeconomic  conditions  between  immigrants  and  natives  invalidate  this 
assumption. As an alternative identification strategy, they propose to parameterise time effects 
as a function of local labour market conditions and allow these to vary between immigrants 
and natives. The findings in this paper support their approach. 
 Our analysis adds a further concern. The strong cyclical pattern in the difference in 
unemployment  rates  between  immigrants  and  natives  within  skill  groups  may  lead  to 
differential selection into work over the economic cycle. To test this we use our German data 
for  the  period  1982  to  2001  and  regress  separately  for  each  nationality/gender  group  log 
wages on the interaction of educational attainment and an indicator variable that takes the 
value one if the individual will be unemployed in the next period. Additional controls include 
age and age squared, educational attainment, and a set of year and region fixed effects. The 
results show that those workers who become unemployed in the next period earn around 15-
25  percent  lower  wages,  compared  to  workers  who  remain  in  employment,  which  points 
towards  negative  selection  into  unemployment.  As  immigrants  react  stronger  to  adverse 
business  cycle  shocks,  those  immigrants  in  work  in  economic  downturns  may  be  more 
positively selected, compared to natives. This may lead to a bias in immigrants’ estimated 
assimilation profiles.
10 The sign and magnitude of the bias will depend on the cyclicality of 
the period that is considered, and the differences in response of the individual groups. 
                                                 
9 See, for instance, Borjas (1995) for the US, Baker and Benjamin (1994) for Canada, Edin et al. (2000) 
for Sweden, or Bell (1997) for the UK; for papers investigating immigrants’ employment and unemployment 
dynamics see, for instance, Chiswick et al. (1997) for the US,  Wheatley Price (2001) for the UK, or Husted et al. 
(2001) for Denmark. 
10  As  noted  above,  selection  may  also  explain  why  our  point  estimates  of  the  responsiveness  of 
immigrant  wages  to  the  economic  cycle  in  Germany  (reported  in  Table  2)  tend  to  be  slightly  smaller  in 
magnitude for some groups than those of comparable native workers. 23 
The results in this paper also contribute to the more recent literature on the impact of 
immigration on wages of native workers. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) argue that, even within 
age and education cells, immigrants and natives may not be perfect substitutes, as is typically 
assumed. They test this hypothesis estimating the parameters of a three level CES production 
function and find indeed evidence for imperfect substitutability of immigrants and natives 
within quite narrowly defined age and education cells. Card (2009), Manacorda et al. (2006) 
and D’Amuri et al. (2008) come to similar conclusions in separate analyses for the US, the 
UK  and  Germany.  Our  findings  of  different  unemployment  responses  of  immigrants  and 
natives over the economic cycle point in the same direction and suggest that within the same 
skill group, immigrants and natives may not be perfect substitutes. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Data and Samples 
The IABS 
The basis for our analysis of Germany is the Employment Subsample 1975-2001 which is 
made available by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). This administrative data set 
comprises a 2 percent subsample of all wage earners and salaried employees subject to social 
security  contributions  in  Germany.  The  data  set  does  not  include  the  self-employed,  the 
military, and workers in the civil service, but does include public sector workers. Overall, 
around 77 percent of all workers in the German economy in 2001 were covered by the social 
security  system  (Bundesagentur  für  Arbeit,  2004).  The  data  also  include  all  unemployed 
individuals  who  receive  unemployment  compensation.
11  The  IABS  does  not  include 
individuals that are out of the labour force. Because of the time period analysed, the numerous 
adjustment processes in the East German labour market after German unification in 1990 and 
the relatively small immigrant population (the immigrant concentration in East Germany is 
only about 2.5 percent in 2001 compared to more than 10 percent in West Germany) we focus 
on West Germany throughout, excluding Berlin. For a detailed description of the data set see 
Bender et al. (2000).  
The Sample  
The sample population for the analysis on Germany comprises all dependent employees 
as well as the registered unemployed. In order to avoid issues of differential labour market 
entries  and  early  retirement,  we  restrict  our  sample  to  the  population  aged  25  to  54. 
Throughout  the  analysis,  we  consider  two  labour  market  outcomes  for  Germany:  the 
unemployment rate and gross daily wages. Some explanation is necessary with regard to the 
construction of our unemployment rate for West Germany. The IABS includes two groups of 
individuals: first, employees who are subject to social security  contributions and, second, 
unemployed  individuals  who  are  recipients  of  official  unemployment  compensation. 
                                                 
11 In 2001, 74.5 percent of unemployed individuals in West Germany received official unemployment 
compensation  –  mostly  either  unemployment  benefits  (Arbeitslosengeld)  or  unemployment  assistance 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe) and are hence recorded in the IABS (Bundesagentur 2004). The remaining 25.5 percent are in 
most cases unemployed individuals whose entitlement for unemployment benefits has run out and who do not 
qualify for the means-tested unemployment assistance.  28 
Therefore, the rate of unemployment that can be derived using the IABS is the number of 
these  unemployed  over  the  total  number  of  unemployed  plus  employees.  The  second 
important labour market outcome variable we use is the daily wage of full-time workers. The 
wage  data  are  taken  directly  from  the  IABS  and  adjusted  to  real  1995  prices  using  the 
consumer price index for all private households. All wages (or log wages) are reported in 
Euros. Wage records in the IABS are top coded at the social security contribution ceiling. We 
impute wages above that ceiling using a tobit-based method suggested by Gartner (2004). In 
the empirical estimations, we include six age group shares (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-
49, 50-54, using the first group as the reference group) and use West Germany’s 10 federal 
states as our regional units.  
The British Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
Our analysis for the UK is based on the British and the Northern Ireland Labour Force 
Surveys (LFS). The British LFS is a survey of private households living in Great Britain, 
carried out by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), while the Northern Ireland Labour 
Force Survey is carried out by the Department of Finance and Personnel. Both surveys used to 
be conducted biannually from 1973 to 1983 and annually between 1984 and 1991. Since the 
spring quarter 1992 the survey in Britain is conducted each quarter and changed to a rotating 
panel, with individuals included in five consecutive waves of the survey. In Northern Ireland 
the quarterly LFS was only introduced in the winter quarter of 1994. Both the British and the 
Northern Ireland LFS collect data on a wide range of aspects of the labour market. Questions 
on  earnings  were  not  asked  before  the  winter  quarter  of  1992/1993  in  Great  Britain  and 
1994/1995 in Northern Ireland. 
The Sample 
From  1981  onwards,  the  UK  Labour  Force  Survey  allows  an  assessment  of 
unemployment status according to the ILO definition of unemployment. The ILO definition 
defines an individual as unemployed if he/she is without work during the reference period, but 
available for work and actively seeking work. Hence, in the LFS individuals who are actively 
seeking work but are not eligible for official unemployment compensation are counted as 
unemployed while the IABS does not cover this group of people at all. On the other hand, 
individuals who are not available for work or are not actively seeking employment but receive 
unemployment benefits are not included in the number of unemployed persons in the LFS, 29 
although they are in the IABS.
12 In order to make unemployment rates in both Germany and 
the UK as closely comparable as possible in this analysis, we exclude the self-employed and 
people on government schemes from our analysis for the UK. The reported unemployment 
rates may therefore deviate slightly from the numbers in official publications. As pointed out 
earlier,  from  the  winter  quarter  1992/1993  (1994/1995)  onwards,  the  LFS  for  Britain 
(Northern Ireland) also contains information on wages of employees. The LFS does not report 
earnings of self-employed people, which, however, does not pose further problems because 
we exclude the self-employed to improve the comparability of our UK results with those of 
Germany. Wage data used throughout the analysis are hourly wages in pounds sterling where 
prices  are  adjusted  to  1995  prices  using  the  consumer  price  index.  In  the  empirical 
estimations, we include six age group shares (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, using 
the first group as the reference group) and distinguish 11 regional units: the three constituent 
countries Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, and the eight standard statistical regions in 
England – London, South East, South West, East Midlands, West Midlands, North, North 
East, and Yorkshire and the Humber. 
                                                 
12 It should be noticed that a sizeable fraction of the German labour force above 55 falls under this 
category.  Based  on  the  ILO  definition  of  unemployment  these  individuals  would  not  be  classified  as 
unemployed. This is one reason why we restrict our analysis to individuals below the age of 55. 30 
Appendix 2: Differential Response to Economic Shocks, Women 




Appendix 3: Equilibrium Search 
This appendix discusses why the volatility of the value associated with a match increases 
with the hazard or separation rate. Given the link between the value of a match, job openings, 
employment, and hence unemployment, this also shows how the separation rate affects the 
volatility of unemployment rates.  
The  value  the  typical  firm  associates  with  a  match,  denoted  by  s J ,  is  given  by  the 
following recursive formula: 
  ( ) s
s
s s s s s J w z J ′
′
′ × − + − = ∑ , 1 π δ β         (A1) 
The notation used in this expression is as follows. Subscripts distinguish different states of the 
economy,  S s∈ , say phases of the business cycle. If the economy is in state  s the value of a 
match,  s J , is simply the difference between the worker's labour productivity,  s z , and his 
wage,  s w , plus the discounted sum of the expected value of the match in the periods to come. 
Here, δ  denotes the separation rate of the labour type considered (thus  δ − 1  is the survival 
probability), and  β  is the discount rate. The terms  s s ′ , π  denote transition probabilities from 
(current) state s to (future) state s′.  
For convenience suppose that the set of different states  S  is finite. Then, using (A1), the 
value firms associate with a match in each state s is (in matrix notation) 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) w z Π Π I J − × + − + − + = K
2 2 2 1 1 δ β δ β                        (A2) 
As long as wages (w ) do not perfectly correlate with labour productivity (z ),  so that the 
firm's match surplus  w z−  is not identical in each state, this expression illustrates how the 
hazard rate δ   affects the volatility of the firm's value of a match (J).
13 
                                                 
13 In most models of the DMP type wages are determined by the standard Nash bargaining solutions. 
Wages in these DMP models fluctuate with labour productivity over the business cycle because threat points 
adjust to the state of the cycle, implying a somewhat dampened oscillation of the unemployment rate. Shimer 
(2005) and Hall (2005) have recently criticised that the standard DMP model predicts a too high volatility of 
wages and too low cyclicality of unemployment rates. To remedy this deficiency, and in light of the fact that 
there is no economic imperative that leads us to prefer a particular bargaining solution, Hall (2005) proposed to 
assume that wages are constant (for all s). He shows that this is an equilibrium outcome as long as the constant 
wage satisfies certain boundary conditions, which ensures that workers always have an incentive to offer labour 32 
Notice that row elements of the matrix  [ ] s s ′ = , π Π  sum to unity which also holds for all 
higher powers of  Π. Let the transition matrix 
T Π  be irreducible and aperiodic (i.e. ergodic). 
Then Πz  is a vector consisting of weighted averages of the elements of z , the vector  z Π
2  a 
vector of weighted averages of the averages and so on. In particular, 
* T k   →   Π z π z1 as 
∞ → k  where 
* π  is the stationary distribution with respect to 
T Π , implying that the greater 
the power of  Π, the more similar are the elements of the sum of the right-hand side of (A2). 
It is hence intuitive that the distance between the extreme elements of the vector  J, say 
s s s J J max
max ≡   and  s s s J J min
min ≡ ,  and  the  unconditional  expectation  of  s J , 
( ) ( )
* / 1 1
T
β δ   − −   π z , decreases as the survival probability  δ 1−  increases.  
To be more specific, let us study the peak-to-peak amplitude of firms’ value of a match, 












1 1 1 δ β δ β  is 
a  weighted  average  of  w z−   since  elements  of  each  row  of 





β δ β δ
≥
 
− − × −      
  ∑ Π   are  nonnegative  and  sum  to  unity.  To  simplify  the 
argument,  we  assume  that  the  averaging  or  mixing  effect  is  sufficiently  strong  such  that 
[ ] ( ) [ ]
max max s
k
s w z Π w z − ≥ −  for all  0 N k ∈ . Then an increase in  δ 1−  always puts a higher 






1 δ β . Hence, the larger δ 1− , the 
smaller  the  expression  ( ) [ ]
max 1 1 s J × − − δ β .  By  the  same  token,  let 
[ ] ( ) [ ]
min min s
k
s w z Π w z − ≤ − for  all  0 N k ∈ .  Then,  the  greater  δ 1− ,  the  larger 
( ) [ ]
min 1 1 s J × − − δ β . This implies that the ratio 
min max / s s J J  decreases in the survival probability 
δ 1−   or,  equivalently,  increases  in  the  separation  rate  δ.  Thus,  the  higher  the  survival 
probability, the less  s J  oscillates around its mean. This example shows that the smaller the 
separation rate, the less sensitive the firms’ value of a match (and hence the number of newly 
created jobs in each period) is to the state of the business cycle. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
and firms always have an incentive to hire the worker. Although not crucial for our argument, the reader may 
follow Hall and assume that wages are constant—while respecting Hall's boundaries. Natives Immigrants OECD  Non-OECD Natives Immigrants OECD  Non-OECD
Education
Low education 16.3 53.1 52.9 53.7 14.5 18.3 12.0 21.6
Intermediate education 73.4 41.0 41.2 40.6 58.5 52.8 56.7 50.7
High education 10.2 5.8 5.9 5.7 27.0 28.9 31.2 27.7
Mean age 39.3 38.0 37.8 38.4 39.5 38.4 37.6 38.8
Mean log wage
Men 4.45 4.23 4.28 4.12 2.18 2.21 2.35 2.11
(0.37) (0.43) (0.40) (0.46) (0.54) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64)
Women 4.15 4.01 4.02 3.98 1.91 2.05 2.11 2.01
(0.49) (0.50) (0.51) (0.48) (0.52) (0.56) (0.59) (0.54)
Unemployment rate
Men  6.8 11.8 11.1 13.5 4.6 8.0 4.5 10.0
Women 5.8 11.1 12.4 8.7 3.6 6.5 4.7 7.7
Regional concentration 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.18
(Herfindahl Index)
UK
Table 1: Individual characteristics in 2001
Source: IABS and LFS. Based on individuals aged 25 to 54. Mean log wage refers to the mean log daily wage in Germany (in 1995 €) and the mean 
log hourly wage in the UK (in 1995 £). Standard deviations for the log wage are given in parenthesis. See Appendix 1 for the definitions of 
unemployment rates in both countries.
GermanySource: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder (VGR d L) for 
Germany; OECD for the UK. Dating of recessions (indicated by the shades) by 
the Economic Cycle Research Institute. Data for Germany only refer to West 
Germany, excluding Berlin.
Figure 1: GDP growth and unemployment ratesSource: IABS and LFS, individuals aged 25-54.
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OECD, GermanySource: IABS and LFS, individuals aged 25-54.































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 
 
OECD, GermanyIABS/LFS (individuals aged 25-54)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Germany UK Germany UK
High education
   Non-immigrant 1 1 1 1
1.789 1.470 1.097 1.387
(0.683) (0.290) (0.225) (0.921)
1.592 1.979*+ -1.702*+ 0.824
(1.277) (0.225) (0.617) (0.361)
Intermediate education
2.412* 2.932* 1.386* 0.885
(0.494) (0.227) (0.090) (0.073)
4.162*+ 2.950* 1.038+ 1.543
(0.962) (0.626) (0.133) (0.469)
5.720*+ 4.193*+ 1.294 1.534*+
(1.436) (0.326) (0.156) (0.249)
Low education
4.515* 3.893* 1.873* 0.934
(0.920) (0.300) (0.118) (0.125)
4.724* 5.119* 1.693* 1.249
(0.959) (1.353) (0.138) (1.120)
6.697*+ 5.537* 1.461*+ 1.062
(1.367) (1.025) (0.210) (0.478)
Observations 3,409 2,372 3,408 1,167
R2 0.631 0.564 0.634 0.5
   OECD
   non-OECD
Table 2: Differential response to economic shocks, men 
Note: Regression estimated using nonlinear weighted least squares, using the cells' population as the 
weights. The sample covers men and women aged 25-54 from 1982 to 2001 for Germany and from 
1981 to 2005 for the UK. In the case of the UK, two years are pooled together such that for the 
unemployment rates we generate two-year intervals starting with years 1981, 1983 and so on. For the 
wage regression for the UK, data is only available from the fourth quarter of 1992 onwards. We 
therefore form two-year clusters 1992/1993, 1994/1995 and so on. As the regional unit we use the ten 
West German states (“Länder”) and for the UK the eleven regional units listed in the text. For details on 
the construction of the outcome variables, see Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
and clustered on the group/education/region level. A (*) indicates the parameter is different from one at 
the 5 percent level. A (+) indicates that the parameter is different from the corresponding parameter of 
the native group at the 5 percent level.
    Non-immigrant
   OECD
   non-OECD
    Non-immigrant
Unemployment Rate Log Wages
   OECD
   non-OECDIABS/LFS (individuals aged 25-54)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Germany UK Germany UK
High education
1.495 0.613* 1.350* 0.887
(0.580) (0.121) (0.166) (0.099)
2.339 0.488 0.474 1.303
(1.375) (0.296) (0.702) (0.463)
0.015 0.221* -0.687 0.971
(1.402) (0.373) (1.242) (0.449)
Intermediate education
1.378 1.036 1.250* 1.067
(0.291) (0.119) (0.085) (0.076)
2.374*+ 1.141 1.095 1.017
(0.591) (0.252) (0.207) (0.335)
2.236* 2.141*+ 1.353 1.412
(0.606) (0.243) (0.372) (0.361)
Low education
2.593* 2.057* 1.774* 1.054
(0.543) (0.235) (0.117) (0.108)
4.098*+ 0.689+ 1.514* 1.844*+
(1.000) (0.548) (0.170) (0.365)
2.499 3.176*+ 0.803+ 1.253
(0.843) (0.557) (0.141) (0.508)
Observations 3,409 2,372 3,408 1,167
R2 0.631 0.564 0.634 0.500
Note: See Table 2.
   OECD
   non-OECD
    Non-immigrant
   OECD
   non-OECD
   non-OECD
    Non-immigrant
Table A1: Differential response to economic shocks, women 
Unemployment Rate Log Wages
   OECD
   Non-immigrantIABS/LFS (individuals aged 25-54)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Germany UK Germany UK
High education
   Non-immigrant 1 1 1 1
0.743 1.889*+ 1.411 2.590
(0.453) (0.431) (1.257) (1.708)
1.604 1.514 4.263 1.574
(1.467) (0.293) (2.408) (0.584)
Intermediate education
2.401* 3.000* 1.374 1.709
(0.516) (0.246) (0.695) (0.610)
3.222* 3.865* 4.561 3.637*+
(0.818) (0.842) (2.233) (1.232)
5.556*+ 3.208* 4.526 2.178
(1.529) (0.362) (2.373) (1.025)
Low education
4.525* 4.005* 4.292 4.526*
(0.968) (0.319) (2.065) (1.564)
3.275*+ 5.388* 5.529 4.925
(0.715) (0.942) (2.676) (2.285)
5.312* 5.702* 7.289 6.628*
(1.293) (1.031) (3.479) (2.842)
Observations 3,330 2,321 3,409 2,192
R2 0.660 0.574 0.238 0.273
   OECD
Note: See Table 2. Sample in column (1) includes only those foreign citizens in Germany who are 
already observed in the data in 1982. Sample in column (2) includes only those foreign born 
individuals who report having immigrated to the UK in or before 1981. Regressions in columns (3) 
and (4) are estimated using ordinary least squares. Entries show coefficients of the interactions of 
HP-filtered regional GDP with each education/nationality group. A (*) indicates the parameter is 
different from one at the 5 percent level. A (+) indicates that the parameter is different from the 
corresponding parameter of the native group at the 5 percent level.
Table 3: Differential response to economic shocks, robustness 
checks, men
Unemployment Rate
Balanced panel Using HP-filtered GDP
   non-OECD
   OECD
    Non-immigrant
   OECD
   non-OECD
   non-OECD
    Non-immigrantIABS/LFS (individuals aged 25-54)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group-specific effect
Group-specific effect 




   Non-immigrant 1 0 1 0
0.570 1.932 1.185 0.529
(1.019) (1.819) (0.621) (1.087)
-1.539 4.639+ 2.266 -0.455
(3.386) (3.320) (0.653) (0.937)
Intermediate education
2.977 -0.816 2.847* -0.166
(1.399) (1.605) (0.461) (0.614)
3.279 1.363+ 4.397*+ -2.229*+
(1.646) (2.111) (0.785) (1.036)
8.285 -3.757 5.524*+ -2.044
(3.922) (4.521) (0.936) (1.322)
Low education
5.209 -0.972 6.053* -3.118*
(2.458) (2.867) (0.993) (1.314)
4.673 0.091+ 11.406*+ -8.999*+
(2.219) (2.702) (2.205) (2.180)
8.355 -2.379+ 7.508* -2.976
(3.992) (4.634) (2.164) (2.300)
Observations
R2
   non-OECD
    Non-immigrant
   OECD
   non-OECD
   OECD
Table 4: Differential response to economic shocks, allowing for 
asymmetries in economic upturns and downturns, men 
Unemployment Rate
Germany UK
    Non-immigrant
   OECD
   non-OECD
Note: See Table 2. Entries in columns (1) and (3) show the parameter estimates for periods of economic 
expansion while entries in columns (2) and (4) show the additional effect during periods of economic contraction. 
Periods indexed as economic downturns are 1982-1983 and 1993-1997 in Germany and 1981-1986 and 1991-
1992 in the UK. In columns (1) and (3), a (*) indicates the parameter is different from one at the 5 percent level 
and in columns (2) and (4) that it is different from zero. In columns (1) and (3), a (+) indicates that the parameter is 
different from the corresponding parameter of the native group at the 5 percent level. In columns (2) and (4) we 
test whether the overall effect in an economic downturn for each immigrant group - the sum of the parameters in 
both columns - is different from the overall effect in an economic downturn of the corresponding native group, with 




0.633IABS (individuals aged 25-54)
Non-immigrant OECD Non-OECD
High education
1 year 0.768 0.741 0.691
3 years 0.515 0.437 0.399
5 years 0.368 0.281 0.285
10 years 0.204 0.148 0.142
Intermediate education
1 year 0.717 0.642 0.595
3 years 0.494 0.393 0.345
5 years 0.380 0.277 0.239
10 years 0.229 0.149 0.119
Low education
1 year 0.639 0.636 0.566
3 years 0.415 0.420 0.343
5 years 0.315 0.316 0.222
10 years 0.182 0.185 0.114
High education 1 1.190* 1.311*
(0.044) (0.070)
Intermediate education 1 1.248* 1.344*
(0.016) (0.025)
Low education 1 0.994 1.187*
(0.014) (0.020)
Table 5: Job separation, men 
Note: Entries in Panel A are non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities of staying 
in a job. Entries in Panel B show Cox proportional hazard ratios of leaving a job relative to 
non-immigrants, estimated separately for each education group. Estimates are based on 
a 30 percent random sample of the IABS and, in Panel B, are stratified by age group and 
year. A (*) indicates that the hazard ratio is different from 1 at the 5 percent level.
Panel A: Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities
Panel B: Cox proportional hazard ratios